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INTRODUCTION
Eastern Europe has ceased to exist. This artificial creation of
Yalta existed only as long as the Soviet Army could support the
doubtful legitimacy of communist regimes throughout the region.
When it became obvious that the Soviets were not going to use
force to stop the wave of change in their European empire, the
only thing needed was the first hole in the dike. After the change
in the government of Poland and the dissolution of the Communist
Party in Hungary, no one could stop the flood of freedom.
The pace of events was astonishing-less than a year, if
counted from the beginning of the Round Table negotiations in
Poland, on February 6, 1989, to the death of Nicolae Ceaucescu
and the victory of the revolution in Romania, in late December.
Only three months passed from the moment that the first non-
communist Polish government took office in September and the
revolution in Romania. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe
was fast. It was so fast that a comparison with another swift wave
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of revolutions, that of the Springtime of Peoples in 1848, almost
automatically comes to mind. By analogy, 1989 was the Autumn of
Peoples.
To me, there is more than an analogy in these two dates. They
mark the beginning and the end of an epoch. While 1848 was the
first revolution against capitalism, 1989 was the first revolution for
capitalism. While 1848 was the first step toward the implementa-
tion of a utopian vision of the perfect society, 1989 witnessed the
end of such attempts. The final blow to utopias was administered a
year later, in the fall of 1990, again in Poland. It was when, in the
presidential elections, over 80% of the Poles voted against Prime
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the intellectual elite which sup-
ported him.
Compared to 1990, 1989 was slow. The visible revolution of
1989 was followed by a less visible one. It was as if frozen societies
began to make up for lost time. In politics, coalitions formed and
broke apart almost monthly, former political prisoners sided with
the people who had imprisoned them, people who would not speak
to each other entered electoral campaigns side by side. In parlia-
ments, constitutions were amended and entire bodies of statutes
were overhauled. New parties emerged daily; there are over 100 of
them right now in Poland, ranging from the fifteen-member Party
of the Friends of Beer to the Social Democrats, with tens of
thousands of members. Every party has its own prescription for
the future and hopes to win parliamentary representation in forth-
coming elections.
The revolution has also involved a restoration: in Poland, the
Czech and Slovak Republic, and Hungary, property confiscated 45
years ago is being returned to the heirs of the original owners. Po-
land has begun to privatize state-owned factories and enterprises.
Recently, an incredible economic energy has surfaced in Poland.
Last year, thousands of retailers were bringing products from the
West and selling them on the streets or even from cars. Now, some
of the very same people are buying up stores and office space that
have been stagnant for years, cleaning them up, renovating them
in a matter of weeks (a miracle by itself, for even today the re-
painting of a state-owned shop lasts half a year, at least), and
opening luxury stores.
The fastest and most dramatic revolution took place in the
realm of ideas. People are discarding today most of what they
deeply believed in only a year ago, such as economic security and
the right to work. They are even throwing away the beliefs, includ-
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ing equality and social justice, that led them to fight communism.
The process is undoubtedly painful.
Although these changes were remarkably fast, they did not in-
volve spectacular events. There was often no demonstrating, no
shooting, no tearing down of monuments. Thus, it is difficult to
perceive the depth of change. The impatient leaders and the newly
emerging opponents of the post-communist rulers seek to acceler-
ate the pace of change. However, when Lech Walesa's call for ac-
celerated change elevated him to the presidency in Poland, it
turned out that the best acceleration was simply the continuation
of policies started by predecessors.
The changes that have taken place are more visible when we
stop to reflect on them. Two recent books on the Eastern Euro-
pean Revolutions of 1989 provide an opportunity for such reflec-
tion. One of them was written before 1989, and one was sent to the
printers in early 1990. Read for this Review less than a year later,
they do not have the flavor of reports from relatively recent events;
they read almost like ancient history. So much has changed since
then.
Timothy Garton Ash's The Magic Lantern' combines the best
qualities of scholarship (Ash is a fellow of All Soul's College, Ox-
ford) and journalism. A frequent contributor to the New York Re-
view of Books and The Independent, Ash has written essays about
Eastern Europe for more than a decade. His previous books were
The Polish Revolution: Solidarity2 and The Uses of Adversity: Es-
says on the Fate of Central Europe,3 which won the European Es-
say Prize. William Echikson, author of Lighting the Night,4 has
been The Christian Science Monitor reporter in Eastern Europe
since 1982. Also a contributor to The Economist, Business Week,
Newsweek and other magazines, Echikson is presently a staff cor-
respondent for The Wall Street Journal. In 1989-90, while work-
ing on Lighting the Night, Echikson was a fellow at Harvard's
Russian Research Institute.
' Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in War-
saw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Random House, 1990). Page references in parentheses
referring to Ash's work are to this book.
' Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (Jonathan Cape, 1983).
" Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe
(Random House, 1989).
" William Echikson, Lighting the Night: Revolution in Eastern Europe (William Mor-
row and Co., 1990). Page numbers in parentheses referring to Echikson's work are to this
book.
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Perhaps Echikson took his fellowship too seriously. In his
book, he never really chooses between personal narrative and a
piece of scholarship. He searches for generalizations to fit all of
Eastern Europe. Although he admits at the outset that there are
more differences than similarities among the countries of the re-
gion, in the book itself the differences are barely mentioned. After
introducing, one by one, the seven countries of Eastern Europe and
their deposed communist leaders (why them?), Echikson picks for
every chapter only those details supporting his arguments or suit-
ing his conclusions. Thus the crucial chapters deal almost exclu-
sively (and selectively) with Poland (Ch 5: "The Workers") or Po-
land and Czechoslovakia (Ch 9: "The Spirit: A Religious Revival,"
Ch 6: "The Intellectuals"). Hungary is also discussed quite often.
Yugoslavia, however, appears only when convenient-when the au-
thor deals with conflicts between nationalities (Ch 14: "The Na-
tions"). Although some chapters are very interesting and well writ-
ten, Echikson's choices seem casual and based almost solely on the
author's direct personal experience. While this would be perfectly
acceptable in a personal report, it is annoying in a book with more
academic ambitions. Moreover, attempts at generalization high-
light Echikson's descriptions of his experiences as naive and artifi-
cial. The same is true of his jokes and anecdotes, which often seem
outdated, at least to an Eastern European reader.
Ash's book reads much better. He sticks to what he saw,
heard, sensed, and smelled: free elections in Warsaw; the re-burial
of Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 uprising, in Budapest; the fall
of the Whll in Berlin; day-by-day narrative of the revolution in
Prague. That's all. Busy in Prague, Ash missed revolts in Bulgaria
and Romania and consequently did not include them in the book.
His narrative consists only of the facts, with minimal analysis.
Generalizations come as logical corrolaries of the facts described.
Some of them are of the highest quality-for examlle, Ash's brief
paragraph about the language of the revolution (p 113) or his re-
marks about the gradual attraction of the East European opposi-
tions to the ideals of capitalist democracy (pp 105, 115, 151). While
writing about the road to the revolutions, Ash once again proves to
be not merely a journalist or a scholar, but one of the most
profound analysts of Eastern Europe in the West, a position he
had already established for himself with The Uses of Adversity.5
The books by Ash and Echikson raise a number of questions
related to the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the future of the
5 Ash, The Uses of Adversity (cited in note 3).
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region. I will analyze some of them using Poland as a case study:
the fall of communism; the relative importance of differences,
rather than similarities, among the various revolutions in Eastern
Europe; the myth of a unified Eastern Europe; and some thoughts
on the future course of the Polish revolution, including a renewed
disparity between the intelligentsia and the workers. I am not cer-
tain if my remarks apply easily to other countries of the region. It
was Poland, however, which began the process of the transition
from communism and today leads the region in bold economic re-
forms. Therefore, what has happened in Poland is not irrelevant to
other countries.
I. WHAT LED TO THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE?
Echikson does not give a precise answer to this question. One
can guess, however, that according to him the economic failure of
communism, combined with the constant struggle of nations who
wanted to win freedom, led directly to the revolutions of 1989. For
him, the beginning of the collapse was the first phase of Solidarity
in Poland, in 1980-1981. Ash moves the beginning one year earlier,
to the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland-a glorious return
to his homeland, which was later called by the Poles "the rehearsal
for Solidarity."
Ash adds three additional elements to his explanation of the
immediate causes of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe:
Gorbachev, Helsinki and de Tocqueville (pp 140-42). Gorbachev
signifies perestroika, glasnost, and a clear message from Moscow
that the Soviets would not intervene to protect the status quo.
Helsinki stands for the moral-and more importantly financial-
pressure from the West that prevented local communist elites,
abandoned by Moscow, from using force against the wave of
change. De Tocqueville once described the most important element
of a revolutionary situation as "the ruling elite's loss of belief in its
own right to rule"; according to Ash, this was precisely what hap-
pened in Eastern Europe, leading to the revolutions of 1989 (p
142). I agree.
A. The Party's Loss of Faith in Itself
It is important to develop this point a bit more, especially
since a great majority of observers put almost all of the emphasis
on the opposition and give little attention to the dynamics of
change within the Communist Party elite. In Poland, the erosion of
the sense of legitimate power among the communist bureaucracy
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was widespread. Ever since the mid-1970s, the middle and upper
level apparatchiks have been cynical. They discarded Marxist ide-
ology and cared solely about their own power and perquisites.
They were determined to defend this power through force or fraud,
whichever was necessary and effective.
This was not necessarily true, however, of the top leaders. The
most surprising aspect of the Polish revolution was that at its very
beginning the communist leaders in Poland agreed to give their
power away. Moreover, the transition was overseen by General
Wojciech Jaruzelski, the very same man who had introduced mar-
tial law in December 1981. Bronislaw Geremek, one of the top Soli-
darity leaders, as well as many of his colleagues, cannot under-
stand the old guard's willingness even today.
I met with Jaruzelski, still in his presidential office, in Septem-
ber 1990. Communism in Eastern Europe was already gone. In Po-
land, the Communist Party had ceased to exist eight months ear-
lier. Many of Jaruzelski's good friends lost jobs and luxury
apartments, and lived in misery. He was unable to help them, de-
spite the powers of the presidency. Walesa and other Solidarity
leaders were calling for his dismissal and new presidential elec-
tions. Jaruzelski was sad, bitter, and lonely. Abandoned by old
friends who felt betrayed by him, he, in turn, felt betrayed by
Walesa and the other Solidarity leaders to whom he believed he
was loyal.
"If you had known that this would be the outcome of the
Round Table, would you ever have agreed to it?" I asked.
"I don't know. Perhaps I would have tried something else. One
thing I am certain of. I would not have tried force," said
Jaruzelski.
"Why?"
"Because I have used it once. I learned it does not work."
I came to believe that the prerequisite of the 1989 revolution-
by-agreement in Poland was the very fact which had seemed so
surprising to me, Geremek, and other observers. This fact was that
Jaruzelski and Walesa still led the opposing camps. They had both
learned through experience that confrontation does not work.
Other leaders, who had not learned this lesson, might have tried
force. Moreover, it seems to me that Jaruzelski himself "lost the
belief in the Communist Party's right to rule," to paraphrase de
Tocqueville as quoted by Ash. I suggest that this transformation
took place in a short period of six months before, during, and im-
mediately after the Round Table negotiations. For Jaruzelski, this
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six-month period was like waking up from a long dream or, more
precisely, like a de-programming experience.
Jaruzelski was not as cynical as the rest of the communist bu-
reaucracy. Their cynicism sprang from the clash of ideology with
reality. As with all authoritarian leaders, Jaruzelski was sealed off
from reality. The communist system wiped out all mechanisms for
feedback from society to the top leadership. The news the leaders
got from the media was censored, and the information they re-
ceived from the bureaucracy was prepackaged to serve the ap-
paratchiks. Their daily life was spent making inter-Party deals.
When they met with outsiders, they heard flattery (begging for fa-
vors) and well-staged lies. In such an environment, it was quite
difficult to start doubting one's own convictions. Authoritarian
leaders usually maintain ideological illusions much longer than or-
dinary people do. This is because they cannot learn from informa-
tion; they can only learn from experience, and not every experience
at that. It takes an earthquake to break through the various pro-
tective screens and catch their attention.
For Jaruzelski, neither Solidarity nor martial law produced
such an earthquake. In 1981, he did believe that Poland was in
danger, although it seems to me that what he had in mind was the
danger of civil war rather than Soviet intervention. In 1981, he still
believed that he was saving the country. The earthquake came
later, with the persistent failure to win the workers' support and
the total economic collapse. By 1988, his plan to win legitimacy by
an economic miracle was doomed. A new wave of strikes and in-
dustrial unrest broke out in Poland. The country desperately
needed Western help just to survive economically. The West made
help contingent upon political change and the opening of talks
with the opposition. So began the tremors ...
In December 1988, Jaruzelski brought a group of reformers to
the Communist Party Politburo and forced the Central Committee
to agree to reinstate the Solidarity union and to begin negotiations
with the opposition. During the Round Table talks, which lasted
for two months, the Party reformers were negotiating a compro-
mise which, in their eyes, would strengthen the Party and help im-
plement a democratic, economically viable form of communism. At
the same time, their decisions were constantly undermined by the
apparatchiks in the government and the Party. The bureaucrats
did not care about the Party or its program. They cared only about
their power and privileges, and they sensed all too well that any
democratic compromise would end these. As a result, two processes
took place. First, the top negotiators on both sides came ever closer
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to each other. Second, the gap between the reformers within the
Party and the Party bureaucrats grew ever wider.
Although Jaruzelski himself did not take part in the Round
Table talks, he had the final voice, at least on the Communist side.
He agreed to partially free elections to be held in June 1989, and
he summoned top Party leaders from all over the country to War-
saw to discuss electoral strategy. "I could not believe what I saw
and heard," recalled Jaruzelski in September 1990. "I thought that
this first true test in many years could help the party to work out a
new, socially acceptable program. Instead of a serious discussion, I
saw selfish, angry bureaucrats unprepared to think about anything
but their own offices and power. I realized I had no common lan-
guage with them."
While listening to the tape of that conversation, I noticed one
interesting detail. While talking about the Communist Party prior
to the Round Table, Jaruzelski used the pronoun "us." When he
talked about the same Party after the Round Table, he used the
third person. It did not surprise me that when Solidarity moved
beyond the limits of the Round Table contract and demanded con-
trol over the government, Jaruzelski, by that time President, re-
fused to use the coercive power given to him at the Round Table
solely to protect the interests of the communist bureaucracy. Be-
sides the fact that he knew it would not work, Jaruzelski was no
longer interested in saving "them."
B. The Loss of Popular Legitimacy
My second point about the fall of communism has to do with
the loss of the regimes' legitimacy among local populations. The
conventional wisdom holds that communism in Eastern Europe
was a totally alien system imposed by Soviet tanks and never ac-
cepted by a substantial portion of the local populations. "The peo-
ple of Eastern Europe always considered communism alien, associ-
ating it with the Russians, whom, with their oriental heritage, they
perceived as culturally second rate compared with Western cul-
tural, religious and intellectual heritage," writes Echikson (p 4).
This convention is a myth. In the form presented by Echikson,
this myth reflects the interests of the Eastern European intelli-
gentsia, an obvious contact and source of information for western
journalists, writers, and scholars in the region. To some degree this
myth reflects the wishful thinking and inevitable denial of the
emigrees from the region who have long dominated Eastern Euro-
pean studies in the West.
In fact, soon after their installment, the communists enjoyed
quite substantial support, and some legitimacy, particularly among
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the workers. The victory over the Nazis and the end to the atroci-
ties of German occupation helped the population to look favorably
on the Soviet Army. In Poland, despite the uninterrupted power of
the Catholic Church, land reform also won some acceptance of the
communists by the poorest peasants. Later, industrialization and
an upsurge in social mobility helped to win the support of young
workers from the villages. During the peak of Stalinism, the popu-
lation could be roughly divided into three parts: a third who were
persecuted by the communists, a third who were neutral, and a
third, at least, who hailed the new system. In the early 1950s, pop-
ular legitimacy decreased, primarily because of economic hardship
and unfulfilled promises of a better life. With de-Stalinization and
the ensuing thaw, legitimacy was restored through some improve-
ment in economic conditions, token democratization, and other re-
forms; nationalist slogans were picked up by local communist
parties.
Thus, the history of Eastern European communism has been a
gradual process of losing popular legitimacy rather than never hav-
ing it. An anti-communist minority consisting of the pre-war estab-
lishment (the Church, the property owners, the administration, the
army, and the non-communist intelligentsia) was joined by new
groups that split from the coalition of original supporters of the
communist revolution.
First to go was the left-wing intelligentsia, which has histori-
cally played an extremely important role in Eastern Europe. With
the absence of capitalists and the middle class, the intelligentsia
was perceived as an agent of change in the interest of the entire
society. Marx believed that the intelligentsia was the least biased
of all social classes and, therefore, should have a crucial role in
workers' revolutions. It is no wonder that Marxism attracted the
intelligentsia, especially since the so-called scientific world view
appealed to a mode of thinking acquired through formal education.
In my view, Marxism was an ideology of the intelligentsia first, and
of the workers second.
Leninism, however, left no room for the intelligentsia. Lenin-
ism is an ideology of the bureaucrats. The clash between the Len-
inist bureaucrats and the Marxist intelligentsia was inevitable. In
the USSR, the bureaucrats simply killed off the intelligentsia. In
Eastern Europe, the intelligentsia became more and more alien-
ated. The Marxist intellectuals split with the communist parties. It
is important to remember that they discarded communism primar-
ily because of the parties' betrayal of the original promise of the
socialist revolution. The intellectuals became disillusioned by the
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system of lies and tyranny, and by the lack of creative freedom.
They did not, however, discard the belief that the intelligentsia,
guided by a sense of social mission, could create a better world for
the people.
Next to go were the workers. They believed in the system; it
promised them bread and democracy. When the promises were not
fulfilled, in 1956 they went to the streets. After blood was spilled in
Poland and Hungary, the workers received new promises: more
consumer goods, more democracy, workers' self-management, and
national reaffirmation. But the system, which was becoming less
and less efficient, could not meet these promises. In 1970, Polish
workers turned to the streets again, and, again, blood was spilled.
The leadership changed; old promises were renewed. And the
workers still believed, but by 1976, when these hopes were once
again frustrated, they too became alienated from the system.
On October 16, 1978, a miracle happened. Karol Cardinal
Wojtyla of Cracow was elected Pope. The bells tolled all over Po-
land. People went spontaneously to the streets. The next morning,
the nation woke up reborn. The Poles stopped fearing the regime.
With the fear gone, the remaining appearances of legitimacy also
disappeared. In fact, a new alliance between the workers and the
intellectuals had already begun to emerge.
C. Uniting the Intelligentsia and the Workers
This leads to the third point about the fall of communism: the
emergence of a broad anti-communist coalition in Poland. As
Echikson suggests (pp 107-08; 119-20; 128-30), Polish workers and
the intelligentsia had a basic unity in their struggle against com-
munism. Although this unity became proverbial, initially it was a
big surprise. No doubt, the two groups needed each other. The in-
tellectuals had a claim to leadership that had long been grounded
in their own history and their traditional sense of mission. They
believed they had a program that could change the system. The
only thing they lacked to implement this program was power.
The workers had potential power-the power of numbers, of
strikes, and of street demonstrations. However, they had neither a
program nor an organization, both of which they needed to turn
their dissatisfaction into reform. At first blush, perhaps, nothing
could seem more natural than a union between the intelligentsia
and the workers. In fact, the intelligentsia and the workers be-
longed to two totally different, incompatible worlds. They had dif-
ferent problems, different needs, and a different sense of values.
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The events in Poland in 1968 and 1970 dramatically evoked these
differences.
In March 1968, Polish intellectuals and students protested
against tightened censorship, violations of freedom of speech and
of the press, and the general lack of intellectual freedoms. Student
protests, led by Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, and other socialist
youth, were violently dispersed by the police and specially pre-
pared groups of "worker activists," armed with wooden clubs. In
response, students went to factories to explain to the workers the
reasons for their protest. They talked about the freedom of speech,
of research, of expression. The workers did not understand. Nor
could they be expected to understand the students' claims. The
workers could speak their minds relatively unrestrained; the police
no longer put them in prison solely for what they said. There was
no censorship in their families, friendly gatherings, or factory
changing rooms. The tightened censorship of a magazine article or
a university lecture was not their cup of tea. They sent the stu-
dents home without support.
The students were no more receptive to the workers' symbols.
Two years later, in December 1970, Wladyslaw Gomulka's govern-
ment doubled the price of meat in Poland. It was two weeks before
Christmas, a traditional time for big feasts. Workers in the port
towns of Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin went to the streets. The
police and army opened fire. Hundreds were killed, thousands
wounded. Workers turned to the students for support. They ex-
plained their plight: frequent violations of their dignity by factory
management, frozen wages, declining housing prospects for young
workers, and economic misery. But the students did not respond.
The state gave them room and board, practically for free. At that
time, the intelligentsia still had high social prestige and was rela-
tively better off than the workers. The workers' plight was not
their cup of tea.
The events in 1968 and 1970 were the culmination of a centu-
ries-old tradition. An extremely important factor in recent and fu-
ture developments in Poland is the character of its intelligentsia.
The intelligentsia emerged in the second half of the nineteenth
century, primarily from the impoverished nobility. It accepted the
basic set of values of the nobility and strengthened the nobility's
concept of social obligations and mission (noblesse oblige).
Throughout the last century, these nobility-intelligentsia values
turned out to be stronger than class and political affilliations. A
student, especially a student of liberal arts whose studies were re-
ally an entry ticket into the class of the intelligentsia (as distinct
from other professionals), was supposed to accept the intelligent-
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sia's values, despite her social origins. For all practical purposes,
higher education, especially in liberal arts, was equivalent -to eleva-
tion to the nobility.
This explains the seemingly surprising fact that, even during
the peak of industrialization, a far greater number of young Poles
wanted to study the humanities and social sciences than to become
technicians, engineers, or professionals. The strength of the nobil-
ity's values survived communism; a majority of students from
peasant or working class origins (who were treated preferably by
the communist authorities) usually adopted, in the course of their
studies, the intelligentsia's values. In fact, this was the only chan-
nel of social mobility in Poland. And by social mobility the Poles,
until recently, did not mean merely enrichment (it was despised)
but advancement to the upper social class.
A distinctive characteristic of Polish history is the gap be-
tween the nobility and the peasants. With the introduction of the
so-called second serfdom in the late sixteenth century, a powerful
(and popular) myth was created, according to which Polish nobility
and peasants had originated from two different ethnic stocks. It
was said that the nobility, the descendants of the so-called Sarma-
tian tribes, had conquered the simple peasants who never actually
belonged to the same nation. This concept of two nations took on a
life of its own and persisted in Poland for centuries. It served as a
reason for depriving the peasants and the burghers of any rights in
the noblemen's republic. The principles of democracy and freedom
were reserved for those in the noble class, itself a matter of birth.
Even in the late eighteenth century, when Poland adopted the sec-
ond written constitution in the modern world, the fear of destroy-
ing the myth (and the nobility's interest in it) was so strong that
the reformers stopped short of granting the peasants citizens'
rights and freedoms. Instead, they promised the peasantry the pro-
tection and care of the government.
And so it continued. While most landlords exploited the peas-
ants ruthlessly, the progressive nobility treated them as children
and offered them the promise of paternalistic care and protection,
contingent upon their acknowledgment of the nobility's supremacy
and obedience toward their protectors. While the nobility thought
in terms of freedoms and privileges for themselves, the peasants
were supposed to think in terms of favors and benefits granted
them by the benevolent elite. The progressive nobility believed
that if they could only take power from the hands of the exploiters,
they would be able to take care of people's needs.
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The intelligentsia inherited this paternalism. Similarly, peas-
ants' children-turned-workers inherited the peasants' sense of
powerlessness along with the expectation of paternal care from be-
nevolent elites. This explains another seeming paradox of the Po-
lish social consciousness which exists to this day: the longing for a
majoritarian democracy combined with the desire for strong, be-
nevolent leadership. Although at the turn of century, the "simple
nation" of the peasants was admitted to the cultural identity of
the Poles, the political and social values of the elites and the
masses remained distant. It was this gap that revealed itself so
painfully between 1968 and 1970.
In 1968, the Polish intelligentsia still believed that they could
change society for the better, if only they could exercise power.
Their aim was to influence the center of power. After 1956, a group
of lay Catholic intelligentsia formed a small contingent in Parlia-
ment called "Znak"; one of the founders was Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
The left-wing intelligentsia, still very critical of the Church and
religion in general, believed that they could directly influence the
Communist Party. They took Khrushchev's speech seriously, and
they believed in de-Stalinization and the promise of democratiza-
tion after 1956. Their program was socialism with a human face,
implemented from the top of the Party structure. The people
would support these policies and benefit from them.
In 1968, two blows were administered to this strategy. First, in
March, after the demonstrations and protests in Poland, the pro-
gram of the progressives within the Communist Party was rejected
not only by the top leadership but also by the majority of Party
members. A home grown class of apparatchiks did not want de-
mocracy or socialism with a human face. They called the progres-
sives "revisionists," rejected them outright, and purged them from
the Party.
In Czechoslovakia, the "revisionists" initially had more luck.
They managed to take control of the Politburo and Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party. But a few hours before the Ex-
traordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, when
change from the top was to reach the Party rank-and-file, reforms
were halted by Soviet tanks. The lesson was clear. Change from
within the system was hopeless. Any attempt to influence the
center of communist power was doomed. The Polish intelligentsia
learned from this example. Instead of attempting to influence the
existing power centers, they sought to build an alternative power
structure. The riots of 1970 and 1976 pointed clearly to the source
of their power: the workers, whose dissatisfaction with conmunism
was growing.
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In the mid-1970s two critical processes took place in Poland.
First, two separate segments of the intelligentsia, the Catholics and
the socialists, overcame their traditional animosity. This rap-
prochement was facilitated by the fact that the struggle for indi-
vidual rights was becoming the central issue for both groups. Sec-
ond, the intelligentsia began to bridge the gap between themselves
and the workers. That is precisely what the KOR (Committee for
the Defense of Workers) was about. After the 1976 riots, a group of
intellectuals ventured to help the oppressed workers. They offered
them legal aid. They collected money to help the families of work-
ers who were imprisoned or fired from jobs. They petitioned the
government to release sentenced workers from prisons. They
sought support from the international community and from human
rights organizations. A year later, when all the workers were freed,
KOR changed its name to the Committee for Social Self-Defense,
KSS-KOR, reflecting its broader base.
This was the beginning of the civil society in Eastern Europe."
With the Helsinki agreement, a number of other human rights or-
ganizations emerged in Poland, as well as the Charter 77 in Czech-
oslovakia. The intelligentsia and the workers acted together to es-
tablish the underground network of "flying universities." In
classes, seminars, and workshops, the intelligentsia helped the
workers to see the direct relationship between their economic mis-
ery and the lack of freedom. The workers, in turn, shared their
experience of strikes and other forms of protest. The workers who
built independent labor unions helped the intelligentsia to ac-
knowledge that they could be self-reliant and responsible partners.
Joining efforts, journalists, professors, and workers published and
distributed illegal books, magazines, and fliers.
In hindsight, we can see two crucial changes that took place
between 1968 and 1980. First, the non-communist intelligentsia
ceased thinking in elitist terms of power and privileges for them-
selves, and began thinking in terms of human rights for everyone,
including the peasants and workers. Second, the workers ceased
thinking in terms of benefits, and began thinking in terms of
human rights for everyone, including themselves. The workers em-
braced the political rights that were so important to the intelli-
gentsia. The intelligentsia, for their part, accepted the social and
economic rights so important to the workers. Human rights be-
' By "civil society," I mean the loosely knit group of underground organizations that
emerged free of communist control. These groups had varying political and economic goals,
but they shared a common opposition to the communist regime. See Part V.B.
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came the common ground on which the workers and the intelli-
gentsia built their coalition. It is not surprising that human rights
were at the top of the list of demands put forward by Solidarity in
Gdansk, in the summer of 1980.
Sixteen months of Solidarity in 1980-81 united the Polish na-
tion: the intelligentsia and workers, as well as all other groups that
did not belong to the communist establishment, were united
against this establishment (or, at least, so it seemed at the time).
The conflict ended with the military victory of the establishment,
but the moral victory of the nation. Eight years later-when
Gorbachev had already replaced Brezhnev's policies, when the
communist economy went into total collapse, when workers over-
came fears and resumed strikes, and when communist elites lost
their belief in their own right to rule-the revolution resumed.
This time it succeeded, not only in Poland but in all of Eastern
Europe.
II. REVOLUTION OR REVOLUTIONS?
The subtitles of the books by Echikson and Ash are almost
identical: "Revolution in Eastern Europe" and "The Revolution of
'89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague." Both au-
thors use the singular rather than the plural form. Echikson as-
sumes that more or less the same process took place in every coun-
try. Although Ash points to a number of differences between
Poland and Hungary, and between Czechoslovakia and East Ger-
many, he seems to share the opinion about one revolution in the
region.
I think the plural is more appropriate. There were six different
phenomena, linked primarily by the chain of events: one revolution
unleashed another, in particular after the collapse of the Berlin
Wall. The events themselves, however, were different and led to
different results. It is even debatable whether the final result of all
the revolutions was the same, because it remains uncertain
whether post-communist forces will soon be defeated in Romania
and Bulgaria. In East Germany, unification with West Germany
almost immediately became the goal. In Yugoslavia, the transfor-
mation has been a total collapse of the federation rather than an
anti-communist revolt.
A. Mutual Beginnings
As usual, the most difficult stage was the beginning. That was
why Poland and Hungary were so important. In these two coun-
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tries the limits of Soviet tolerance were to be tested first. Did per-
estroika and Gorbachev's denouncement of the so-called Brezhnev
Doctrine, as well as his support for the reformers within the Com-
munist Party, mean that he would tolerate the total overthrow of
communism? Free elections? Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?
During the Round Table negotiations in Poland, the question
about what was acceptable to Moscow was often raised, not only
by the communists but also by Solidarity leaders who had to cool
down their more radical rank-and-file. The "Moscow Factor,"
along with the fear of reaction by local security police and the
army, was a major reason for a negotiated compromise and a grad-
ual transition in Poland. When Moscow did not try to prevent Sol-
idarity from taking over the government in September, much more
radical, and faster, revolutions became possible in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and the rest of the region. However, they might
not have erupted so fast without an unwanted contribution by the
late President Ceaucescu of Romania.
Let me elaborate on this detail that is often overlooked
(neither Echikson nor Ash mentions it), even though it accelerated
the chain of revolutions in the region. In 1988, Nicolae Ceaucecsu
increased the pace of forced romanization of a large Hungarian mi-
nority in Transylvania. Ethnic Hungarians in Romania had be-
come so badly discriminated against and so fearful that thousands
of them began crossing the Danube to escape to Hungary, despite
the fact that the Romanian border guards shot ruthlessly at the
escapees. In time, ethnic Romanians also joined their Hungarian
compatriots to escape from Ceaucescu's hell. By early 1989, tens of
thousands of escapees from Romania were in Hungary, and the
Hungarian government had to secure shelter and food for them.
Plagued by its own economic difficulties, Hungary turned to inter-
national organizations for assistance. Hungary was promised help
contingent on its ratification of the International Convention on
Refugees. 7
In April 1989, the Hungarian and Austrian foreign ministers
cut the barbed wires at the border and established free passage
between the two countries. Soon after that, the citizens of East
Germany, who could travel freely to Hungary, began to run away
through the Austro-Hungarian border. East Germany asked Hun-
gary to stop them and send the runaways back home, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the treaty between the two countries.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (July 28, 1951).
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The Hungarian government found itself caught between the treaty
with East Germany and the Convention on Refugees, which pro-
hibits the return of a refugee if he will be persecuted in the home
country. If the Hungarians sent the East Germans back, they
would jeopardize prospects for international assistance for the ref-
ugees from Romania. After some deliberations, the Hungarians
chose the Convention.
Hundreds of thousands of Germans escaped through Hungary.
Soon, they were flooding Warsaw and Prague as well. The first hole
in the Berlin Wall had been pierced. Moreover, this massive emi-
gration brought the message back to the people who remained in
Leipzig, East Berlin, Magdeburg, and Rostok that escape was pos-
sible. Massive emigration also undermined the facade of legitimacy
of the East German system. With new hope and encouragement,
people went to the streets, and the Wall fell.
Also relevant was the fact that East German escapees drove to
Hungary through Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Czechs and Slovaks
could also see the exodus. Later, when the agreement between the
Hungarian, Austrian, and West German governments was reached,
trains with East German refugees to the Bundesrepublic were
crossing Czechoslovakia once again. The Czechs could see the
Germans heading for freedom. This created some fervor among the
Czechs themselves. After the fall of the Wall, they were ready for
their own revolution in Prague.
As with waves at sea, each revolution picked up some energy
from the preceeding one and could not avoid building its own mo-
mentum. It makes sense that each revolution was shorter than the
preceeding one. Echikson quotes Prague graffitti which read: "ten
years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in East Ger-
many, and ten days in Czechoslovakia" (p 11). Although Ash cor-
rects Echikson, noting that "ten days" lasted at least nineteen (p
78), there is no doubt that the pace of events quickened over time.
B. Separate Development
Although these beginnings were largely shared by the Eastern
European countries, the differences in their revolutionary courses
quickly emerged. One significant difference was in the very mood
of the revolutions. Ash tells of celebrations at the Berlin Wall and
describes in detail the eighteen days of revolutionary festivities in
Prague (pp 61-130). When initial fear and uncertainty disappeared,
positive emotions and feelings flooded Germany and Czechoslova-
kia. Joy, happiness, and hope were widespread. The Poles could
only envy their neighbors. The revolution in Poland was serious
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
and gray. True, after the electoral victory in June, many young
demonstrators went to the streets. True, there were triumphant
rallies when the Solidarity government was sworn in. But only a
handful of activists participated in these events. The people were
tired and quite often uninterested.
The change in Poland came too late for joy. The Poles had
seen their big days in 1980. Later, during martial law, young peo-
ple had their heyday when they went out to the streets to fight riot
police. In 1989, there were no riots, no demonstrations, no popular
unrest, but only the spreading paralysis in economic life, con-
stantly escalating prices, lack of hope, doom and gloom. The begin-
ning of the Round Table stirred some interest, but the negotiations
lasted too long for enthusiasm to endure. When a compromise was
finally signed, the Poles were too tired to really enjoy it.
As everybody knows all too well, the revolution in Romania
had a different character of violence, terror, and mourning. If there
was any ecstasy over the abolition of a tyrant, it was overshadowed
by anger, hatred, and a strong thirst for revenge. Violence seldom
leads to a peaceful and serene ending.
Still more important were the differences in larger patterns of
development that paved the way to change in each country. These
different roads to revolution have visible consequences in the cur-
rent problems of the Eastern European countries. Interestingly,
the pattern of change in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia fol-
lowed the scenarios suggested in 1986 by Ash in "Does Central Eu-
rope Exist?"-one of the very best essays ever written on Central
Europe."
In Poland, it was a revolution from outside the system. As
noted, by 1980 the opposition intelligentsia joined forces with inde-
pendent workers' leaders and channelled popular discontent into a
revolt against communism. After martial law was introduced in
1981, the revolt continued in the form of the civil society, growing
outside of the communist-controlled state. The growth of the civil
society, and the withdrawal of support for the communists by the
workers were the sources of strength for the opposition. With each
side understanding the strength of the other, a negotiated compro-
mise between them became possible. In 1989, a total collapse of the
economy, perestroika, and pressure from the West, helped produce
a compromise. When free elections proved that support for the
I Ash, The Uses of Adversity at 179 (cited in note 3).
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communists was weaker than anyone had expected, the compro-
mise was transcended.
This transition through negotiation had important conse-
quences. First among them was the relatively slow dismantling of
the bulwarks of communism in Poland. While in Czechoslovakia
one of the first moves was the dissolution of the security police, in
Poland it took almost a year. The old bureaucracy stayed in office
until the presidential elections in November 1990, and despite the
changes in top government positions, a majority of economic and
administrative decisions were still controlled by the members of
the communist nomenklatura.
The second consequence of the Polish mode of transition was
the lack of retribution. In Romania, Ceaucescu was shot, for better
or worse. In Bulgaria, Zhivkov could be brought to trial. In Czecho-
slovakia, the most compromised communist leaders could be held
responsible for their deeds. Immunity for them was neither prom-
ised nor implied. Although the Solidarity side at the Round Table
claims that they did not make any deals with the communists, the
personal security of the latter was presumed. Such was the effect
of the "bold line" with which Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki
promised to divide the post-communist future from the communist
past. Haunted by growing hardships, seeing the members of the
nomenklatura among the richest private businessmen in Poland,
and watching the news about their counterparts in Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, and East Germany on trial, the Poles were becoming bit-
ter and resentful.
The third consequence of a negotiated transition in Poland
was by far the most important. The workers' leader Lech Walesa
was undoubtedly perceived by the communist government as the
most important partner in a negotiated compromise. However,
Walesa needed advice and assistance to negotiate with the govern-
ment. His natural choice for negotiations were outspoken intellec-
tuals rather than workers and union leaders. Thus, the first post-
communist establishment that was formed in anticipation of the
Round Table negotiations consisted primarily of the intelligentsia.
After the compromise was reached, the same intelligentsia mem-
bers were appointed by Walesa as candidates for the seats allo-
cated to Solidarity in Parliament. Thus, the seed of the new (old)
social conflict was planted.
In Hungary, the process of change was different. Workers were
not so strong an element of the opposition as in Poland. There was
no insurmountable gap between the government and the society.
On the contrary, "goulash communism" had won significant sup-
port for Janos Kadar. The leaders of the Hungarian opposition did
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not believe in the efficacy of mass protest against communism.
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981 pro-
vided them with sufficient proof that it could not work. They put
some hope in international pressure, primarily by the "united in-
telligentsia of the world," exerted on the Soviets. Internally, the
Hungarian intellectual opposition believed in enlightened change
from the top. Gyorgy Konrad, one of the leading philosophers of
the opposition, wrote in 1984:
The best we can hope to achieve is an enlightened, paternalis-
tic authoritarianism, accompanied by a measured willingness
to undertake gradual liberal reforms. For us, the least of all
evils is the liberal-conservative version of communism, of the
sort we see around us in Hungary.'
And so it happened. A group of reformers inside the Hun-
garian Communist Party began the reforms. This process fostered
various opposition groups, which emerged during the last years of
communist rule in Hungary. Consequently, the first Round Table
in Hungary gathered these opposition groups so that they could
work out their common position vis-A-vis the Party. Only later did
they begin negotiations with the Communists. Not surprisingly,
relatively soon after the collapse of communism, the alliance dis-
integrated into its original members and a number of new group-
ings that emerged during the transition. The emergence of the
multiparty system was much less painful than in Poland.
In Czechoslovakia, the workers never really rebelled. The 1968
Soviet intervention came a few hours before the workers in the
Party were to become a major part of the reform movement. The
opposition could not count on gradual change from above, for there
existed no "above." Gustav Husak and his cronies had purged all
intellectuals and reformers from the Party; there was no enlight-
ened leadership. In 1988, frightened by perestroika in the USSR,
the apparatchiks engineered a preemptive coup, replacing the ail-
ing Husak with "strong man" Milos Jakes.
True, there was Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. However, it did
not have such strong social support as the KOR in Poland. True,
there was some mounting dissatisfaction among the young people,
environmentalists, and students. However, there was no one at the
top to listen to their petitions. In 1985, Vaclav Havel saw the crea-
tion of "the fifth column of social consciousness" as the only viable
Quoted in id at 202.
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strategy for the opposition in Czechoslovakia. 10 Truth, non-vio-
lence, self-sacrifice, and persistence were to prepare the ground for
change. The change itself, however, could only be triggered by an
event outside the control of anyone in Czechoslovakia. Revolutions
in Poland and Hungary, and especially in East Germany, provided
the necessary catalyst. The revolution in Czechoslovakia was swift;
it took place in the streets and at rallies rather than in a long pro-
cess of preparation and negotiations. The existence of Aleksander
Dubcek, of Charter 77, and of Vaclav Havel saved the revolution
from chaos by providing it with an alternative leadership and
structure.
In Bulgaria, the street events were in some ways similar to
those in Czechoslovakia. However, there was not much organized
opposition or alternative leadership. No one could present a credi-
ble claim to power. Thus, the communist leadership managed to
maintain control over events. By sacrificing Zhivkov, and bringing
his communist opponent Peter Mladenov into leadership, the Bul-
garian communists bought some time. This helped them to win the
elections. Now, they are playing a major role in the transition to a
market economy. One can expect a long road ahead for Bulgaria.
In Romania, Ceaucescu and the Securitate were in a class by
themselves, unlike anything that had existed in the region since
Stalin. A bloody revolution ensued, the first round of which ended
with the replacement of the tyrant and his guard by "normal"
communists who changed their name to socialists and repainted
their faces to look more human.
Finally, the revolution in East Germany had little in common
with all the others. What began as reform, led by a bunch of re-
formers from protestant churches and opposition intelligentsia,
soon turned into the unification with West Germany.
There was only one common thread connecting all of these
revolutions: what began as a moderate change quickly transcended
its original scope. There were two reasons for this. First, between
1968 and 1989, a great majority of opposition leaders had come,
often painfully, to believe that socialism with a human face is a
contradiction in terms and cannot work. Ash gives an excellent ac-
count of that process in the last chapter of The Magic Lantern.
Second, the actual force of appeal of communism turned out to be
close to zero. When the Soviet might was removed from the picture
10 Quoted in id at 199.
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in Eastern Europe, there was nothing left for the regimes to hold
on to.
Fortunately, neither the regimes nor the oppositions realized
this weakness. If they knew that they had virtually no support, Po-
lish and Hungarian communists would never have consented to ne-
gotiations. They would have postponed the solution and prepared
for another confrontation. It was only by virtue of communist arro-
gance that the rest of Eastern Europe avoided the lot of Romania.
Let me close this sketchy comparison of patterns of change
with a brief remark about the developments in the Soviet Union.
Glasnost was a long-overdue dream of the Soviet intelligentsia. By
introducing it, Gorbachev created an alliance between himself and
the intellectual elite of the country. With perestroika he took a
step forward and began to reform the system. Neither Gorbachev
nor the elitist intelligentsia, however, cared about organizing the
workers and winning their support for the reforms. Perestroika re-
mained a revolution from the top. When changes became too radi-
cal for the bureaucracy, the apparatchiks began the counteroffen-
sive. They remained the strongest social and political force.
Consequently, Gorbachev began to balk. His retreat from glasnost
alienated part of the reformist intelligentsia, even more so because
they found an alternative in Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of na-
tional liberation movements in the republics. With the growing
radicalism of the republics, the bureacratic backlash increased.
Gorbachev needed a strong force on which he could base his poli-
cies. Never having won the workers, and having lost the intelligent-
sia (which, incidentally, turned out not to be strong enough-or
willing enough-to implement radical democratic changes), his
choices became limited to the Party bureacracy and the army. If he
chooses the latter, the best possible scenario is a long process of
nondemocratic economic change from the top, constantly under-
mined by the most powerful social group, i.e., the bureaucracy, and
jeopardized by the disintegrating tendencies in the republics. The
disintegration will continue until Russian workers wake up and be-
gin to exercise the power they potentially could have.
III. DoEs EASTERN EUROPE EXIST?
This question is a paraphrase of Timothy Garton Ash's "Does
Central Europe Exist?" His very question about a sub-region of
Central Europe implies a negative answer about Eastern Europe.
Echikson is uncertain. "Eastern Europe, after all, is a misnomer,"
he writes at the very beginning of his book:
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It never was a monolithic bloc. It is a region full of deep dif-
ferences-different nationalities, different traditions, different
histories. The imposition of Soviet-style communism not only
failed to wipe out these differences: one of the exhilarating
and dangerous aspects of the present revolution is the redis-
covery of unique national identities. My contention remains,
however, that the former Soviet Empire can be dealt with as a
whole. Eastern Europeans face common problems. All are
small countries, fearful for their very existence. All have bro-
ken the Communist Party's monopoly of power. All now must
pick up the pieces of their bankrupt centrally planned econo-
mies. Everywhere in these societies which long preached egali-
tarian ideals, inequality has mounted. Religious belief has be-
come more powerful. A defiant young generation has emerged.
(p 4)
A. Similarities and Differences
Let me make a few points about some of the issues raised by
Echikson. First, consider the historical heritage of the region. Since
1988, I have been guest-teaching a university course in the United
States called "Human Rights in Eastern Europe." The standard
mid-term paper asks students to describe similarities and differ-
ences between the countries of Eastern Europe. Reading students'
papers, I am always struck by a clear pattern that emerges: the
predominance of dissimilarities before 1945; growing similarities
under communism, with two peaks, one in 1950-55 and another in
the late 1960s through the mid-1970s; and, finally, a growing differ-
entiation between the countries of the region in the last decade.
The major historical similarity was that the countries of East-
ern Europe did not belong to the West. (East Germany was an ex-
ception; the Czechs and the Poles, however, would claim they be-
longed to the West in a cultural sense.) Another common
characteristic was a period of national subjugation to imperialist
powers (although Hungary, even though a weaker partner in the
Austro-Hungarian empire, could claim exception). Ethnic and na-
tional conflicts, as well as differing degrees of nationalism, also
characterized all of the countries of Eastern Europe. Another com-
mon trait was economic and social backwardness. Sharp social po-
larization between tiny minorities of landowners and the great ma-
jority of poor or landless peasants, lack of a middle class, and weak
capitalism characterized all countries of the region (with the excep-
tion of the more industrialized Czech lands). In politics, most of
the countries of the region began an independent national exis-
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tence after World War I as majoritarian parliamentary democra-
cies, and most of them slid into authoritarianism in a relatively
short time.
These characteristics were not unique to Eastern Europe.
They were shared by many of the post-feudal societies of Southern
Europe, Latin America, and, later, Southeast Asia. What really
matters is how individual nations cope with such common heri-
tages. In this respect, the countries of Eastern Europe had almost
nothing in common. Coping mechanisms that had developed under
Turkish, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Prussian domination va-
ried. Local self-government and parliamentary representation of
the landowning elite could develop in the Austro-Hungarian em-
pire, whereas the progressive paternalism of the elite emerged to
countervail the Czars' despotism in the Russian empire.
Personal values and behavior had been shaped by religions. In
that respect, Eastern Orthodox Christianity in Bulgaria and
Romania reinforced despotism and the passivity of the people. In
Poland and Slovakia, Catholicism went well with the paternalism
of the elites, while the Protestant churches in Germany paved the
way toward capitalism and individual responsibility. Protestant in-
fluence among the Czechs and Hungarians also distinguished them
from the Poles for whom the Reformation was not much more than
a passing fad among the upper nobility. I maintain that different
religious backgrounds were of great importance throughout the
communist period and are becoming more and more visible today,
even though in some countries a majority of the post-World War II
generation has never been to a church or said a prayer.
Another historical difference involved the role of the nobility
and the origins of the intelligentsia. As noted, the nobility played a
crucial role in Poland, and the intelligentsia inherited their set of
values. The intelligentsia also played an important role for the
Czechs; however, they had very little in common with their Polish
counterparts. The Czech intelligentsia did not inherit the nobility's
values, because their nobility was almost totally extinguished at
the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. Therefore, while Polish in-
tellectuals represented the values of a descending upper class, the
Czech intelligentsia expressed the views of the ascending lower and
middle classes. This difference is clearly visible in every encounter
between an educated Pole and a Czech, even though they both
might have belonged to the opposition. The Slovaks, by contrast,
had neither nobility nor much intelligentsia of their own. This ex-
plains the degree of their ethnic anxiety and the desire for a dis-
tinct national and political identity.
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This brings us to perhaps the most significant problem of all:
the heritage of nationalism and ethnic animosity within the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe. The problems of ethnic minorities inside
particular countries were reinforced by the animosities among the
reemerging countries in the region after World War I; Hungary op-
posing Romania, and Poland participating in the dismemberment
of Czechoslovakia at Munich, are only two examples of the inheri-
tance of hostility, animosities, conflicts, and resentments in the re-
gion. This sad heritage is becoming visible once again in post-com-
munist Europe.
Does this mean that Eastern Europe never existed as a coher-
ent region? It did, but only for about ten years, from the mid-
1960s through the mid-'70s. My point is that any coherence had
less to do with Russian domination and more to do with the emer-
gence of the national communist elites who voluntarily adopted the
Soviet model of social organization.
B. Communism in Its Historical Modes: Common Lessons in
Difference
Communism in Eastern Europe can be roughly divided into
four phases. This general outline, however, cannot be allowed to
overwhelm the unique historical events in each country. But it is
useful to derive some common themes from these events, even if
their importance varies among the countries involved. A, weakness
in Echikson's book is that the foreign observer often seeks unity at
the expense of precision.
1. The coercive phase.
The first phase of communism ran from the communist take-
overs (roughly in 1948) until 1956. It can be called the "coercive
phase." Nationalization and rapid industrialization were intro-
duced with the use of repression and coercion. Stalinism was im-
posed either directly by the Red Army and the KGB or by local
servile communist elites dominated by the Soviets.
2. Nationalist communism.
The second phase, between 1956 and the mid-sixties, can be
labeled the period of "nationalist communism." With the rejection
of Stalinism and direct coercion and the realization that the crea-
tion of a Marxist paradise might take longer than initially as-
sumed, communist parties in Eastern Europe attempted to win le-
gitimacy with nationalist rhetoric. Another reason for nationalist
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communism was the emergence of a new generation of indigenous
communists who wanted to take-power away from an older "inter-
nationalist" guard. The internationalism of the proletariat was lim-
ited to hugs between the leaders and common subordination to the
Kremlin. In daily rhetoric, the word "nation" was used more and
more often. The Polish United Workers Party claimed to speak on
behalf of the Poles, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
claimed to represent the best interests of the Czechoslovak nation
(did it ever exist?), the Hungarian Party spoke for Hungarians, the
Bulgarian, for Bulgarians; and so on.
The results were disastrous. If a party was to represent all of
the people and the nation at the same time, it followed that the
people could be only one nation. Minorities and ethnic groups had
to be ignored or wiped out. As a consequence, Hungarians in
Romania were forcibly romanized, Turks in Bulgaria were made
Bulgarians, Jews and Germans in Poland were encouraged to emi-
grate, and the Czechs and the Slovaks were made Czechoslovaki-
ans. This intolerance was consistent with the dominant ideology of
the system, which did not encourage diversity or pluralism.
This sad inheritance has already become the most difficult
problem for post-communist governments in all the countries of
the region, with the exception of Poland. National and ethnic rival-
ries are perceived as the principal threat to democracy. I am not so
pessimistic. Nor would I rush to condemn emerging nationalism
and ethnic revivals. After decades of subjugation, nations and mi-
norities need to reassert their independence, define and re-define
their identities, cherish their own distinct pride. Without this, they
will not be able to overcome pervasive animosities, fears, and re-
sentments. Western Europe is strengthening its community today.
It is easy to forget that it became possible only after Charles de
Gaulle helped rebuild national pride in France, and other countries
could also reassert their distinct identities. One can be impressed
with the pace of the unification process once the participants' basic
identity needs have been met.
3. Cynical communism.
The third phase of communism in Eastern Europe can be
called the "cynical" or "pragmatic" phase. It came about in the
late 1960s, when local communist elites realized three things: first,
that the economic promise of socialism could not be fulfilled, at
least not for everybody; second, that without economic perform-
ance nationalist rhetoric would not maintain legitimacy for long;
third, that the economic reforms necessary to revitalize the system
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would cause the elites to lose political power. They flatly rejected
reforms and chose to maintain their own power and privileges. De-
Stalinization granted the bureaucracies a sense of personal secur-
ity. Now they needed a constitutional system that would secure
their power and help them dominate their own societies.
The model was ready. It was the Soviet, post-Stalinist legal
and constitutional system. Interestingly, at this time most of the
Eastern European countries introduced Soviet-like changes in their
constitutions. It was not because the leaders were more frightened
of Brezhnev than their predecessors were of Stalin. They adopted
the system which served well the interests of the local
nomenklatura.
In essence, this system created almost unlimited privileges for
the bureaucracy (in the 1970s, many of them became hereditary by
law), combined with a broad array of controls over society. Coer-
cion and terror were downgraded to become potential controls to
be used against the active opponents rather than for daily opera-
tion of the system, as was the case under Stalinism. Legal mea-
sures, a lack of human rights and due process, and the absence of
individual remedies continued to help control the population.
However, by far the most important were economic and social
controls.
The state was the main employer and the party-state bureau-
cracy controlled nearly everyone's employment, advancement, and
well-being. The bureaucracy also controlled information: the me-
dia, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, and instruction in
the schools, colleges, and universities. The censorship degenerated
into control over any criticism or information which was unwel-
come by any individual within the party system. The bureaucracy
controlled associations and professional organizations; the nomen-
klatura installed its own candidates in leadership positions in as-
sociations; the security officers penetrated the staff of social orga-
nizations, which were also put under tight financial controls.
Finally, the bureaucracy selectively employed a wide system of var-
ious benefits to subjugate society: issuance of passports and access
to foreign currency; special coupons that permitted the purchase of
a car, a house, or other scarce products, often for half of the official
price; vacations in luxury resorts; and awards and honors. These
were just a few of the selective system of benefits to promote loy-
alty to the system and cooperation with it. The role of these con-
trols increased as the economic crisis worsened and consumer
goods grew ever more scarce.
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The degree to which this system was implemented varied from
country to country. In Czechoslovakia, where the state was the sole
employer in the economy, it was relatively easy to control the ac-
tivists of the Prague Spring through economic means; after 1968,
professors were made caretakers and trashmen, journalists were
banned from their jobs, the opposition was put into economic de-
privation. During the years of martial law in Poland, when a small
but vital private sector survived, a significant number of Solidarity
activists joined the private sector and became independent produc-
ers. The power of the Church in Poland created a hole in the sys-
tem of tight control over information (the Church had its own pub-
lications and some institutions of religious instruction) and over
association (the Church was a forum for relatively uncontrolled so-
cial activity). These are two of a number of reasons why in Poland
the civil society, an opposition, and a strong organization for
change developed more effectively and sooner than in other coun-
tries of the region.
However, for the bureaucracy the ideal was the same every-
where. It was the Soviet-like system of economic and social control
that would protect the interests of the nomenklatura. During this
period of domination by a "new class," the similarities among the
countries of Eastern Europe in their constitutional, legal, and po-
litical systems reached their peak. It was during this period that
one Eastern Europe truly did exist.
It did not last long. Economic and social crisis divided the re-
gion once again. Although the reasons for the economic crisis were
similar (i.e., the inability to get from the so-called "extensive"
phase of the industrialization to the "intensive" one without a
deep political transformation that would undermine the power of
the nomenklatura), its pace and direction differed. The means em-
ployed to cope with the economic and political crises were also dif-
ferent. They included liberalization and martial law (again) in Po-
land; slow reforms from the top in Hungary; growing austerity and
terror in Romania; tightened controls in Czechoslovakia; and
cheating and manipulation in Bulgaria. After Gorbachev de-
nounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had given the Soviets the
right to intervene in defense of communism throughout the em-
pire, every country chose its own, again historically determined,
way of coping with crisis. Eastern Europe ceased to exist long
before the overthrow of the communist monopoly of power; it
ceased to exist when the countries of the region entered the fourth,
and last, phase of communism, the "phase of crisis."
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4. The post-communist crisis.
Today, at the beginning of post-communist development, the
countries of former Eastern Europe still have many similar
problems. Echikson enumerates some of them: "to pick up the
pieces of their bankrupt centrally planned economies," and to deal
with mounting inequality in societies that "long preached egali-
tarian ideas" (p 4). One can add to his list a number of other sig-
nificant similarities; for example, the weakening of the original re-
formist elites that led to the fall of communism.
However, the differences predominate. The power and legiti-
macy of new governing elites vary as do the prospects for the emer-
gence of alternative power elites. The power and the unity of the
opposition is different in each country. The power of the society,
especially of the workers, and the degree of their organization, are
different. There are also various national and ethnic conflicts
within and among the countries of the region. It will be these dif-
ferences, rather than any similarities, that determine, once again,
the future of every country.
C. Central Europe?
It seems clear that Eastern Europe does not exist. The phrase
has fallen out of usage even within the region. In Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia, it is being replaced by the new description
"Central Europe." Does it exist?
It does not for someone who happens to travel between Poland
and Czechoslovakia. Ash compares the frontier between the two
countries to the Iron Curtain (pp 145-47). President Havel himself
asked the Czech and Slovak government to ease restrictions on
travel between Czechoslovakia and Poland. This request was in
vain. Central Europe does not exist for a Pole in Hungary, who
encounters hostility instead of once proverbial friendship. It does
not exist for a Czech coming to Warsaw, who is patronized by the
Poles, bragging about their noble traditions and their primacy in
revolutions.
In his essay "Does Central Europe Exist?" Ash wrote, "to say
that Poland is to Central Europe as Russia is to Europe would be,
no doubt, somewhat facile.""' Nevertheless, he raised an interest-
ing question. He also noticed that a leading organizer of the Polish
opposition, Adam Michnik, never used the notion of "Central Eu-
11 Id at 188.
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rope." Instead, he always talked about direct links to the West.
This is not surprising; Poland never really did belong to Central
Europe. In the past, Central Europe might have encompassed
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, at best, the southern part of Poland
belonging to Austro-Hungary in the nineteenth century. The Po-
lish intelligentsia, however, emerged primarily under Russian occu-
pation. Despite an almost complete denial of this fact, the Polish
intelligentsia's world view was influenced to a high degree by the
progressive Russian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century. Pater-
nalism, elitism, a sense of mission, and a claim to one truth all
originated from this same source. Denying this influence, the Poles
have usually emphasized their cultural links with Western Europe.
If Central Europe ever existed, it did so primarily as an ideal.
It existed in the minds of Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian
intellectuals. It existed in the realm of the spirit, as a place in
which the real European culture never surrendered to the force of
market capitalism. In his essay "The Tragedy of Central Europe,"
Milan Kundera made precisely this point.12 Central European in-
tellectuals felt betrayed by the West because the West compro-
mised the cultural ideals of Europe, the ideals for which the Hun-
garians died in 1956. Not much has changed since then. Eight
years later, in the conclusion of his book about the Revolution of
1989, Ash writes, "I have sometimes thought that the real divide is
between those (in the West) who have Europe and those (in the
East) who believe in it" (pp 153-54).
In 1989, the idea of a confederacy with Czechoslovakia and,
perhaps, Hungary was voiced quite often in Poland, especially by
the intelligentsia who still believed in the realm of the spirit. In
1990, the confederacy seemed impossible, and the idea was largely
discarded. Three countries were facing capitalism, which produced
a competitive spirit among them ill-suited to confederacy. It
seemed that every country would separately race to the West, to
the Common Market, to the Council of Europe, and to Western
credits.
Then, on February 15, 1991, a miracle happened. Presidents
Lech Walesa of Poland and Vaclav Havel of the Czech and Slovak
Republic, as well as Prime Minister Janos Antall of Hungary, met
at the historic site of Visegrad in Hungary to sign a declaration of
friendship and cooperation. 3 Central Europe was announced as a
'2 Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, NY Rev of Books 33 (Apr 26,
1984).
13 Stephen Engelberg, Three Eastern European Leaders Confer, Gingerly, NY Times §
1 at 25 (Feb 17, 1991).
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political fact. It happened a month after the Soviet intervention in
Vilnius, the heralded retreat from perestroika. A common threat
helped to form an alliance that could not be formed by common
interests. Perhaps then we have come to see, however accidentally,
a mini-Central Europe?
IV. WHERE IS THE END?
Ash and Echikson are both somewhat reluctant to make pre-
dictions. Of course, it is no small task to understand what hap-
pened yesterday, or is happening today, and anticipating the fu-
ture is a dangerous business, particularly in light of the political,
economic, and ethnic turmoil in the various countries. Even if we
are to witness growing cooperation and friendship within Central
Europe in the future, it is still more useful to avoid generalizations
and treat every country separately, with its own problems and so-
lutions. I conclude with some comments about the continuation of
the revolutionary process in Poland.
A. The Aftermath of Revolution
The most casual awareness of history indicates that the vic-
tory of a revolution usually is only the beginning of a long revolu-
tionary process. A revolution is a way to force change in the face of
resistance on the part of established structures. Thus, revolutions
mobilize all the groups and individuals dissatisfied with existing
reality. The leaders of revolutions usually attract followers by mak-
ing promises. Even if they do not make promises, revolutions raise
expectations. These expectations are usually too high and often
contradictory (for example, the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth-cen-
tury revolutions had different expectations than the peasants and
workers who would be employed and exploited by that very bour-
geoisie). To meet these promises and expectations, enormous re-
sources are needed. Revolutions usually break out when the trea-
sury is empty, and, by themselves, they do not produce much.
Successful revolutions (a minority of those that break out) at best
create conditions for future growth.
Thus, the real problem of every revolution is how to deal with
the frustrated expectations of those who will pay the price of re-
forms and future progress. This phase usually takes more time,
pain, and blood than the original assault on the pre-revolutionary
establishment. Cromwell used more force against the levelers and
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the diggers than against the King of England and his court; the
Jacobin phase of the French revolution was more bloody than the
original assault on the Bastille.
There is no reason why the present wave of revolutions should
be different, especially since there was an implicit contradiction in
the original aims of the process. In Poland, the Round Table con-
tract between the communist government and the opposition was
about democracy. Democracy means the will of the majority. In an
impoverished country in which the standard of living has continu-
ously decreased, the will of the majority naturally called for fast
improvement in living conditions.
This was impossible without a drastic overhaul of the eco-
nomic system. But economic reform and the introduction of an ef-
fective market system would not lead to immediate improvement
either. The workers and peasants would pay the price for change.
Prices had to be frozen to stop hyperinflation, emerging capitalism
had to be permitted to use the workforce to its economic advan-
tage, and the elimination of a huge budget deficit necessitated cuts
in the state's expenditures. In short, the prescription for post-com-
munist Poland was to get the nation's permission (if the reforms
were to be democratic) for another period of economic deprivation
and sacrifice.
The government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, sworn in in Septem-
ber 1989, initially had immense popular support for its program of
bold economic reform. It believed that the very fact that
Mazowiecki led the first post-communist government in Poland as-
sured legitimacy for the government and its reforms. Public opin-
ion polls supported this conviction. However, by late February
1990, Solidarity union leader Lech Walesa began to claim that this
line of credit was almost exhausted. He called for the purging of
the communist nomenklatura, which was still entrenched in the
upper and middle levels of state administration and economic
management. Walesa also provoked new divisions within the Soli-
darity coalition and urged the government to speed up reforms. In
the bitter presidential race that ensued, these divisions solidified
and new coalitions emerged.
In November, Prime Minister Mazowiecki suffered a bitter de-
feat in popular presidential elections (he did not even qualify for a
second round after being defeated by Stanislaus Tyminski, a to-
tally unknown businessman of Polish origin from Canada). In De-
cember, Lech Walesa replaced General Jaruzelski as President of
Poland, and a new government, dominated by liberal economists,
took over. Interestingly enough, although the Poles voted against
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radical economic reforms, Lesczek Balcerowicz, a deputy prime
minister in charge of reforms, retained his position, and the new
government continued his policies. This would substantiate the
claim that Walesa's original goal was to increase legitimacy for
Balcerowicz's plan by getting a substantial majority of the popular
vote.
However, the by-products of electoral campaigning can jeop-
ardize the results. Walesa and Tyminski made promises during the
campaign. Replacement of the government created a new wave of
expectations. Now, we are witnessing the next round of frustration.
How will the new government, and Walesa himself, deal with this?
We may soon know, but even today the situation in Poland is more
tense than a year ago. There is even less enthusiasm and hope,
more bitterness, frustration, and fear.
These events, however scary, are only a superficial expression
of a much deeper change that took place in Poland in 1990. In fact,
during that short period, two basic axioms of social research about
the last phase of communism proved invalid: the strength of the
civil society to effect the transition to democratic government, and
the growing unity between the intelligentsia and the workers.
B. The Civil Society
Ever since the early 1980s, a majority of scholars and observ-
ers agreed that a crucial agent of change in Poland would be the
emerging "civil society." The civil society was a growing network of
underground organizations outside of communist control. In fact, it
was the civil society that Solidarity represented at the Round Ta-
ble in Poland. A logical conclusion was that, with the end of com-
munism, the civil society would evolve into pluralistic and demo-
cratic political structures.
The developments in Poland disproved this hopeful conclu-
sion. By mid-1990, the civil society had disintegrated and demo-
cratic structures had not yet been built. It turned out that the civil
society, instead of being a solid foundational structure, was merely
a set of strategies and instruments to countervail the power of the
communist system. As noted, these controls were economic domi-
nation, monopolization of the media, control over association, and
selective distribution of benefits. These were precisely the spheres
in which the civil society developed. It began with KOR activists
collecting money to support the families of imprisoned or fired
workers (to counter economic control). It grew through an im-
mense network of underground publications, newspapers, and
magazines (to counter the monopolization of the media and censor-
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ship) and through underground associations and unions (to
counter the control over social life). It also created an alternative
network of benefits which could be provided outside of state con-
trol (in this respect the help from the West, channelled by the
Church in Poland, was crucial).
Not having its own economic base, the civil society was just a
response to communism. With the end of communism, there was
no longer a need for this countervailing mechanism. The civil soci-
ety began to disintegrate. The disintegration was also a natural re-
sult of the fact that with Solidarity's victory a great majority of
civil society activists became members of Parliament or of the new
administration. It turned out to be virtually impossible to sustain a
Polish form of the civil society (a bulwark against the state) with
the very same people who became a part of the state.
C. Growing Disunity Between Workers and Intelligentsia
The second axiom about the developments in Poland was the
belief that with Solidarity in 1980-81, with martial law, and with
the growth of the civil society, the gap between the intelligentsia
and the workers came to a close. The electoral campaign in 1990-91
proved this belief false. In fact, the gap between the intelligentsia
and the people (workers and peasants, at least) has never been so
wide as last year.
In view of this development, Lawrence Goodwyn's Breaking
the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland4 turns out to be
prophetic. A historian of the labor movement in America, Good-
wyn was attracted to Solidarity. Between 1982 and 1985 he
researched a book in which he meticulously reconstructed the ori-
gins of Solidarity and its 16-month existence in 1981-82. In the
book, published in the United States in April 1991, and ready for
publication in Poland, Goodwyn challenges the conventional wis-
dom, according to which without the help and guidance of the in-
tellectual advisors from the Church and KOR, Solidarity would
never have emerged. Goodwyn claims that Solidarity was built on
the original experience of Polish workers, who had learned, by
1980, the lessons of strikes and protests in 1956, 1970, and 1976.
According to Goodwyn, the intelligentsia merely joined the workers
and then tried to use their experience to its own benefit.
" Lawrence Goodwyn, Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland (Oxford,
1991).
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No doubt, Breaking the Barrier is the most controversial book
ever written about Solidarity. It has a number of shortcomings.
The author does not understand at all the significance of the Ro-
man Catholic faith for Polish workers. The book is also very repet-
itive and boring at times. But it is generally fascinating and eye-
opening. It infuriated one of the two Polish translators, and almost
all the other readers from the Polish intelligentsia who got hold of
the manuscript. One explanation would be that Goodwyn is totally
wrong, but, after the 1990 elections, it seems much more likely that
he touched an all-too-sensitive nerve in the Polish intelligentsia.
As noted above, because of the negotiated character of the
transition in Poland the intelligentsia dominated the Solidarity
delegation at the Round Table and then in Parliament. It also
dominated Mazowiecki's government. Once in power, the intelli-
gentsia began to implement its old vision of benevolent reforms in
the best interest of the people. They worked out an intelligent plan
of action. They put it into operation and have had many good re-
sults. I am convinced that history will accord enormous credit to
what the Polish intelligentsia did for the country during its opposi-
tion to communism and during the transition away from it.
The only thing the intelligentsia-dominated government and
Parliament neglected was to communicate with the society. They
claimed to rule "for the people," but they definitely did not rule
"by the people" or "through the people." In private conversations,
some deputies to Parliament and members of the government ex-
pressed contempt toward ordinary people. With an exceedingly
bitter presidential campaign, they ridiculed their opponents and
labeled them populists. After the defeat of their leader,
Mazowiecki, some prominent members of the intelligentsia were
quoted as saying that "the nation did not grow up to democracy."
By then, it was quite obvious that the traditional paternalism of
the Polish intelligentsia had resurfaced. When 80 percent of the
Polish voters cast their votes against Mazowieski, my hope is that
it was not so much because of economic misery or personal ambi-
tion, but that it was precisely this paternalism that they were
rejecting.
Thus, the revolution of the entire Polish nation against the
communist elite was followed by the revolt of the people against
their paternalistic elite. At that point, the revolutionary process
entered the third phase. It can be called "capitalism against social-
ism." In this conflict, socialism is symbolized by big, inefficient fac-
tories that produced low quality goods at immense costs. In capi-
talism, such factories would be closed; this is what the German
government plans to do with its East German inheritance. How-
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ever, the existence of these factories is being defended by the mil-
lions of workers employed in them. The current wave of strikes has
been undertaken in defense of the wages of communism. The strik-
ers are defending the very values and mechanisms that hamper the
growth of capitalism and free markets, i.e., egalitarianism, agree-
ment to waste, inefficiency, and lack of personal responsibility for
the results of one's actions and for one's life.
It is uncertain whether this battle-against a great number of
the workers-can be won with the simultaneous development of
democracy. But even if it is won, it will not be the end of the strug-
gle. For when capitalism wins over socialism in Poland (and this
probably applies to the rest of the former Eastern Europe as well),
it will open a new conflict, between the emerging capitalists and
the workers. At that point, former communist countries will get
back to the very same point where the idea of a pre-planned para-
dise had originated before 1848-to nineteenth-century capitalism,
with all its conflicts and problems. They will reenter capitalism,
however, with already ineffective industry, with a polluted environ-
ment, with a ruined social/political atmosphere, and with a devas-
tated morale.
Such will be the final price of utopia.
